CITATION: (2019) 3 SCC 39; 2018 INSC 905
JURISDICTION: Supreme Court of India (Original Jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
BENCH NAME: Dipak Misra, C.J., and R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra, JJ.
INTRODUCTION
Indian jurisprudence reached a significant historical milestone on September 27, 2018, when a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its verdict in Joseph Shine v. Union of India[1]. The judgment is extremely notable as it officially terminates the old penal laws that treated married women as their husband’s property. Section 497 of the IPC,1860 criminalised adultery in such a way that was inherently gender discriminatory[2]. This provision treated women as their husband’s chattel and prolonged patriarchal ideas which sabotaged women’s autonomy and dignity. By unanimously striking down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), the judgement not only decriminalised adultery but also re-established the constitutional principles of gender equality, individual autonomy, and the right to privacy[3]. This underscores how our understanding of the Constitution evolves with changing times and how archaic laws that no longer fit in contemporary times should be scrapped.
As Dr D.Y. Chandrachud stated, “Section 497 demeans the piece of marriage by a structural design which is bound to subvert gender equality. It vestigially retains the structural inequalities of a bygone era where a woman’s identity was merged into that of her husband… The canvas of the Constitution is a dynamic text intended to break the shackles of gender subordination.” [4]
FACTS OF THE CASE
The petition was brought under Article 32 of the Constitution by Joseph Shine, an activist who challenged the validity of Section 497. Under this provision, it was an offence for a man to have consensual sexual relations with a married woman without the “consent or connivance” of her husband. The law exempted the married woman from any criminal liability as an abettor, treating her merely as an object with no autonomy over her sexual or legal decisions.
Simultaneously, Section 198(2) of the CrPC mandated the procedure, establishing that only the husband of the married woman could be recognised as the “aggrieved person” allowed to lodge a complaint. If a married man engaged in an extramarital affair with an unmarried woman or a widow, his own wife had no standing to initiate prosecution.
Driven by these severe legal inconsistencies, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court to strike down the framework for treating women as their husband’s proprietary asset.[5]
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
The core legal issues discussed in this case by the court were:
- Whether Section 497 of the IPC and Section 198(2) of the CrPC violate the guarantees of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws under Article 14.[6]
- Whether the challenged provisions discriminate against individuals on the ground of sex alone under Article 15(1), or if they could be saved as protective affirmative action under Article 15(3).[7]
- Whether criminalising consensual sexual choices between adults within a marriage violates the right to life, dignity, and personal privacy under Article 21.[8]
Arguments of the Parties
- Petitioner’s Arguments: The petitioner argued that Section 497 IPC was arbitrary because it made an act criminal or innocent based solely on a husband’s permission. The law maintained inherent gender inequality by protecting men while completely silencing women, letting a husband prosecute his wife’s lover while leaving the married woman completely powerless to take legal action against her cheating husband.[9]
- RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS: The government defended the law by stating that it kept families together and protected the sanctity of marriage by discouraging adultery. They claimed that shielding women from criminal prosecution was not discriminatory, but rather a form of protection granted by the Constitution.[10]
Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, striking down Section 497 of the IPC and Section 198(2) of the CrPC, to the extent of its application to adultery, as unconstitutional and void.[11] The Court granted clear relief by declaring that while adultery remains a valid civil wrong and a legitimate ground for the dissolution of marriage across personal family laws, it can no longer be treated as a criminal offence.[12]
Reasoning of the Court
The court’s judicial logic was more or less based on the modern-day interpretation of fundamental rights:
- Doctrine of manifest Arbitrariness: Applying the standard from Shayara Bano v. Union of India, the court held that a law is arbitrary if it is volatile or lacks an adequate determining principle.[13] Section 497 was arbitrary because it did not protect marriage uniformly; it allowed an affair to occur if it happened with the consent of the husband, ignoring the fact that it still corrupts the marriage.
- Rejection of Coverture and Stereotypes: The court rejected the colonial common law doctrine of coverture, which basically meant that a woman’s independent identity is absorbed into her husband’s identity once the marriage is solemnised. The bench ruled that Article 15(3) exists to provide real power and equality to women. It is meant to uplift women, not to treat them as passive victims who have no control over their own lives.[14]
- The Right to Privacy: Drawing directly from a historical ruling in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the court observed that sexual autonomy and intimate personal choices are more concerned with an individual’s privacy and is protected under Article 21.[15]
RATIO DECIDENDI: The State has no right to use criminal laws to control the private, consensual sexual relations between adults.[16] A law that treats a married woman as his husband’s property is not only archaic but also barbaric and violates Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. It eventually hampers the fundamental rules of equality and personal freedom.[17]
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Joseph Shine ruling is an excellent example of serving true, real-life equality instead of just equality on paper. It is a great instance that shows how courts and judicial power can significantly positively impact society. The bench must be praised for looking past the fake excuse of protecting women. By calling out its real patriarchal nature, the court rightly proved that treating women like helpless beings is as damaging as explicitly punishing them.
However, a deep analysis of the same points towards a small flaw. The court heavily focused on an individual’s personal rights and autonomy but didn’t address how to protect the structure and sanctity of marriage itself.[18] By completely decriminalizing adultery, the bench assumed that civil options like filing for a divorce are easy and available to everyone. But the Indian reality is way darker. Many women in India are heavily dependent on their husbands financially and face massive hurdles and setbacks trying to fight long civil lawsuits. Therefore, taking away the threat of criminal prosecutions completely leaves vulnerable spouses with no way out when a marriage collapses.
Despite the little criticism, the court’s decision to decriminalize adultery remains sound and justified. Using criminal laws to punish adultery was a massive overreach. Criminal law is for public crimes, whereas adultery is a private matter. Using the threat of criminal prosecution to force people to stay faithful is a completely ineffective use of the government’s power.
On top of that, the court showed real courage by striking down three of its own past rulings, such as Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay,[19] Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India[20] and V. Revathi v. Union of India[21], that had defended the old law under the excuse of keeping domestic peace.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Joseph Shine ruling advanced Indian laws to align with global human rights. It establishes that families cannot use tradition to strip away an individual’s constitutional rights. Eventually, the verdict serves as an enduring reminder that marriage is a matter of equality.
Author: Anushka Mishra
Year of Study: Second Year
College: S.S. Khanna Girls’ Degree College, University of Allahabad
REFERENCES
[1]Joseph Shine v Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39
[2] Indian Penal Code 1860, s 497
[3] Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 198(2)
[4] Joseph Shine v Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 [para 178] (per Chandrachud J)
[5] Joseph Shine (n 1) [ para 34] (per Dipak Misra CJ)
[6] Constitution of India 1950, art 14
[7] Constitution of India 1950, art 15
[8] Constitution of India 1950, art 21
[9] Joseph Shine v Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 [para 14]
[10] Ibid [para 26]
[11] Joseph Shine (n 11) [para 73] (per Dipak Misra CJ)
[12] Joseph Shine (n 11) [para 115] (per Nariman J)
[13]Shayara Bano v Union of India (2017) 9 SCC
[14] Joseph Shine (n 1) [para 112] (per Nariman J)
[15] KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
[16] Joseph Shine (n 1) [para 178] (per Chandrachud J)
[17] Ibid [para 210] (per Malhotra J)
[18] Law Commission of India, Revision of the Indian Penal Code ( Law Com No 42, 1971) para 1941
[19] Yusuf Abdul Aziz v State of Bombay [1954] SCR 930
[20] Sowmithri Vishnu v Union of India (1985) Supp SCC 137
[21] V Revathi v Union of India (1988) 2 SCC 72
